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This paper argues that whetherestimatesof the welfare cost of natural or artificial trade
barriers that do not discriminate by quality are subject to positive or negative specification bias
when using models which do not explicitly recognize quality variation depends on the reference
point used in couriterfactual equilibrium analysis. We use numerical general equilibrium
techniquesto generate counterexamples to the widely held view that (in the competitive case)
incorporating quality upgrading will tend to reduce the welfare costs of quality invariant trade
barriers. To do this, we use a trade-distorted equilibrium as the reference point; rather than free
trade.
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and NBER1. INTRODUCTION
Specification bias is a term widelyusedby econometricians to describe situations
where estimators will be systematically biased in one direction due to the use of an incorrect
model (such as excluded variables). These issues, however, also arise in deterministic
models. Here we examine how such biases operate in analyses of the effects of trade
barriers (such as quotas) which do not discriminate by quality, arguing that the sign of the
specification bias depends on the reference point used in counterfactual equilibrium anaiyths.
We term this phenomenon reference point dependence.
The widely held belief is that including quality upgrading in models will (in the
competitive case) tend to reduce the welfare costs of quality invariant artificial (quotas) or
naturalbarriersto trade; i.e., models which exclude quality variation exhibit positive
specification bias for predictions on the welfare costs of such barriers. This is because
possible substitution into higher qualities is missing if quality variation is excluded from the
analysis (Rodriquez (1979)), and adding additional substitution possibilities tends to mitigate
the effects of such trade barriers and reduce their welfare costs.
We show how using a trade-distorted equilibrium as the base case (i.e., reference
point) for counterfactual analysis, rather than a free trade reference point, reverses the bias.2
If the reference point is an equilibrium in the presence of the trade restriction, and if an
observed quota premium value has been taken as given in calibration, then with more
2Das and Donnenfeld (1987), and Krishna (1987) have shown that even using free trade
as a reference point, models which do not capture quality upgrading overstate welfare costs if
a monopolistic market structure is introduced in the exporting country. Our analysis here,
however, demonstrates reference point dependence for the conventional and widely held
intuition developed for the competitive case.2
substitutionpossibilities rather thanless(i.e., capturing quality substitution effects as against
not),the gains from unwinding the restriction will be larger.3 The alternative intuition is
that, viewed from a trade-distorted equilibrium, adding substitution possibilities raises
measured welfare costs of such bathers since more substitution possibilities must have been
distorted in generating the observed premium value associated with the trade restriction.4
We also show that conventional results on the effects of quality upgrading on the
relative price of higher to lower quality goods are subject to specification bias. These can be
reversed by incorporating the common developing country feature that higher quality goods
are produced mainly for export markets. The well-known proposition that quality upgrading
raises the relative price of lower compared to higher quality goods in the quota-restricted
market (Falvey (1979)) is thus dependent upon using as a reference point a small open price-
taking economy for whom world prices remain unchanged. In the case where the price-
3What we portray as the standard proposition on quality upgrading also stands in contrast
to what one finds in the tax literature on the related issue of the comparison across models
with differing levels of disaggregation. In this literature, the presumption is that increased
disaggregation in models (such as between high and low-quality products) raises the
measured cost of tax distortions, reflecting Harberger's t-square rule and the presence of
increased variation in tax rates at more disaggregate level. Shoven and Whalley (1992), for
instance, report added distortion costs of 30 percent when 2 sectors are disaggregated into 10
sectors in a U.S. capital tax model, with model comparisons made on an equal-tax yield
basis.
4The empirical literature on quality upgrading does not discuss these issues, but instead
seeks to measure the extent of the upgrading. Feenstra (1984) attributes 30 percent of the
price rise for Japanese autos in the U.S.underthe U.S.VEtprogram in the 1970s to quality
upgrading. Borastein and FeenstTa (1987) similarly evaluate quality upgrading in steel; Aw
and Roberts (1986, 1988) and Aw (1992) evaluate upgrading effects for Taiwanese and
Korean footwear in the U.S. Anderson (1985) analyzes quality effects due to U.S. cheese
import quotas, but estimates the extra cost of quotas that produce different ad valorem
equivalents across different grades of cheese relative to an equivalent constant ad wiiorein set
of trade restrictions; a different set of issues than those taken up here.3
takingassumptionis dropped and where exporters produce high-quality products largely for
the export market (which is typically the case) and domestic consumption is primarily of low-
qualityproduct, the conventionalprice effects attributed to quality upgrading can be
reversed.4
2. PREVIOUS DISCUSSION OF SPECIFICATION BIAS AND OUALITY
UPGRADING
Qualityupgrading is the substitution of higher quality for lower quality products (or
vice versa) in production or consumption, and is typically caused by natural or artificial
barriers to trade that do not discriminate by quality. Examples are transport costs which
result in proportionally more higher quality items being shipped between regions, such as
between the Western and Eastern U.S.'; and apparel import quotas which make no quality
distinction and hence cause quality subsitution, such as those administered in terms of
number of items or square yardage allowed to be imported.
A central proposition in the literature is that the measured welfare costs of such trade
restrictions are smaller in models which incorporate quality upgrading than in models which
do not, since upgrading provides opportunities to substitute out of the restrictive effects of
barriers: i.e., models which fail to capture quality variation show positive specification bias
in their predictions as to the welfare costs of such barriers. Feenstra (1984), following
Rodriquez (1979), shows this by representing quality upgrading as changes in the amount of
services provided per physical unit of product consumed.
Thus if
(I) S=xQ
5Atchian and Allen (1972) (and cited by Jones (1984))suggest transportation barriers as
the explanation for why proportionally more higher than lower quality apples are shipped
between the western and eastern states of the U.S. than consumed there.5
where x denotes services per physical unit, and Q denotes physical units, then S denotes
service inclusive units of the product, and the effects of tariffs and quotas on imports of Q
differ,since a tariffonthe value of importshas no effect on x, whilea quota increasesx.
Toanalyzetheeffectsof eitherincluding or excludingquality upgradingfrom
analysesof the impacts of quotas which do not discriminatebyquality,Feenstra(and
Rodriquez) considers thesimple case wherethereis nodomesticproduction. With service
units wholly imported,onlydemand side effects of the trade restrictions come into play.
They consider the case of a VER with rents fully transferredbythe importing to the
exporting country, anduse a partial equilibrium measure of the cost to the importing country
ofthe trade restriction. Thus, given5(p), a compensated demand functionfor service
inclusive units, the costtothe importingcountry (capturing quality upgrade effects through
inducedchanges in .r) of introducing the trade restriction is
(2) .CIPSN+I(Ap5)
whereAp denotesthechange in the priceof services inducedby the trade restriction,C
denotesthe quantity of service inclusiveunits demandedin the presenceofthe trade
restriction (i.e., ap SNisthe rent transfer abroad), andAsis the change in servicedemand.
The term4ApSsis the Flarberger measureofwelfare loss in the importing country, to
whichany rent transfershavetobe added.
Ifquality upgrading were ignored in the analysis, anddemandsmeasuredinphysical
not serviceunits, aq (rather thanAs)denotes the quantity change, and px becomes the price6
per physical unit. Thus, in ignoring quality upgrading, the cost to the importing country of
introducing the trade restriction is
(3) a(px)qM+(M,px)Aq)
where'p .r) is the change in the price per physical unit, and q" is the physical quantity
demanded in the presence of the trade barrier. The term A(p x) q" is the measured rent
transfer in this case, and Aq is the change in physical quantity demanded.
Subtracting (2) from (3) yields a clear overestimate of the cost to the importing
country of imposing the trade restriction, attributable to not taking into account quality
upgrading: i.e.
(4) Ax (p°qM • pNq0)
where Ax is the increase in service units per physical unit with the introduction of the quota
(quality upgrading), and p°. f, q°, and if' are prices of service inclusive units and physical
quantities before (0)andafter (N)theintroduction of the quota. Al! the terms in (4) are
positive; hence ignoring quality upgrading leads to an overestimate of the costs of a quota
which does not differentiate by quality.
A second proposition in the literature, due to Falvey (1979), concerns the pricing
effects of quality upgrading. This can be shown in the simple case where there are two
imports, one high and one low quality, with, for simplicity, constant marginal cost of
production c, and c. for each in the exporting country. If good I is of higher quality, and if
units of products are measured in comparable physical terms (say, tons), then c1 > C3. ifa7
tariffappliesat rate ito both products, then consumer prices in the importing country
increase proportionately;i.e.,
(5) p =(1+t)c1;;p" =(ln)c2
andrelativeprices remain unaffected by the tariff.If,however, a physical quota (of the
VER type) is used by the importing country, exporters equate per-unit profits across the
products shipped; i.e., p' -c1 p' -C2, where p' and p' are again the consumer prices
for goods I and 2 after the quota is introduced. Since C1 > c2, p'Ip' < c11c2; i.e., the
relative price for the higher quality good falls.S
3. SHOWING REFERENCE POINT DEPENDENCE FOR OUALITY
UPGRADING SPECIFICATION BIAS
Toshow reference point dependence of the specification bias which can arise when
evaluating the welfare effects of quality invariant trade barriers, we use the same applied
general equilibrium methodology as set out in Shoven and Whalley (1992) of calibration of
models to a base-case equilibrium data set followed by counterfactual equilibrium analysis for
changes in policy or other parameter values. We perform such analyses for an arbitrarily
chosen numerical model formulation, and for different model variants (with and without
quality upgrading), and for different reference points (free trade or trade-distorted equilibria).
The results from these computations confirm conventional wisdom using free trade as a
reference point, and are opposite to conventional wisdom using a trade-distorted equilibrium
as the reference point, showing that the specification biases involved is dependent on the
reference point chosen.
The conventional approach in numerical simulation work, including using the applied
general equilibrium models discussed in Shoven and Whalley is to calibrate models to
observed bather-ridden equilibria and compute free trade equilibria as counterfactuals.
Thus, in evaluating the specification bias which can arise from not incorporating quality
variation in analyses of trade barrier impacts, proceeding in the opposite direction from
theoretical analyses (i.e., beginning from an observed barrier-ridden equilibrium) seems the
natural way to proceed, but is at variance with procedures held in pure theory which on
grounds of tractibility begin from free trade. But, if model calibration is made to an
observed quota premium value (modelling practice being to calibrate to observables), using9
models incorporating quality upgrade possibilities increases (not reduces) the welfare cost of
trade restrictions because a given premium value for a quota restriction generated by a model
with more substitution possibilities implies high distorting costs.
The models that we use to investigate these examples of specification bias are
deliberately kept simplesince our purposeis to show clear counter examples to conventional
wisdom, rather than to use a higher dimensional, more empirically based stnicture, but with
a less transparent formulation. In each model, there are two countries (North and South) and
either three goods (high quality, low quality, and other goods), or two goods (composite, and
other goods) depending upon whether or not quality variation is incorporated. For
simplicity, production in each country is specified by a transformation frontier rather than
through explicit production functions. We use nested CE!' (Constant Elasticity of
Transformation) functions in each country, with GDP being defined over the composite good
and other goods. In the model with quality variation, the composite covers high and low-
quality components in a second level. Preferences in the two regions reflect the same
structure, with CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) utility functions being defined over
other goods and the composite, which, in the model with quality variation, is an aggregation
over high and low-quality components.
In both models, the North imposes export quotas of the VER form upon all but the
other good, with quota rents transferred to the Southern exporter. Quotas are expressed in
terms of physical units; adding across high and low-quality imports in the model without
quality variation. Since prices of goods are on a physical (not hedonic) unit basis, prices of
high-quality goods are above those of tow-quality goods in the base-case data, reflecting the10
quality variation. Equilibrium in the no-quota case is characterized by global market clearing
for all goods. In the presence of quotas, there is a further market clearing condition within
the country market for quota-restricted goods, as well as for the quota itself. In the model,
equilibrium prices for quota-restricted items in the North and South are endogenously
determined, along with world prices for other goods and quota premia.
Using the same approach, the relative price effects across lower and higher quality
products generated on the demand side in importing countries, and stressed in existing
literature, can also be analyzed alongside the production side effects in exporting countries,
which are not discussed in the literature. Indeed, if, as is common in developing countries,
high-quality products are produced largely for export markets with low-quality products
produced largely for domestic markets, the relative price effects from the production side can
dominate the demand side effects stressed in the literature.
Details of the procedures wefollow in using these models to show the reference point
dependence for specification bias we claim above are set out in Table 1. We first construct a
simple benchmark equilibrium data set incorporating quality substitution in the presence of
binding import quotas, covering trade, production and consumption. Using this data set, we
(hen construct a further base-case equilibrium data set without quality substitution, identical
in aggregated value form to the model with quality upgrading. This enables us to calibrate
comparable models (with and without quality variation) in the presence of barriers using each
data set; i.e., with a constant quota premia across models with and without quality upgrading
(boxes (1) and [2] in Table 1).11
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Counterfactual free trade equilibria arethencomputed for each of the models, with
andwithoutqualityvariation(boxes [3] and[4] inTable 1). We then compare across models
to see which yields higher estimates of welfare gains from eliminating the quota trade restric-
tions (box (5] in Table1).
The computed free tradeequilibria are then used to perform alternative calibrations to
freetrade datasets (boxes[6] and[VI)for models with andwithout qualityupgrading, and
we then computecounterfactual equilibria in the presence of quotarestrictions (boxes (8] and
[9]).Onceagain, wecompare across models to see which yields the higher estimates of
welfarecosts from imposing quotarestrictions(box [10]). Evaluating the twopairwise
modelcomparisons (box [5] andbox [10]),we assesswhether,assuggestedabove, the
outcomedependuponthereference point(i.e.,beginningfrom barrier-ridden equilibria
(boxes(I] and [2J),orfromfree tradeequilibria (boxes [6] and [7]).13
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS FROM MODEL CALCULATIONS
We have used the procedures set out in Table 1 to show how the specification bias
involved in excluding quality upgrading from analyses of the measured welfare costs of trade
restrictions depends on the reference point used. In Tables 2 and 3, we report numericaj
calculations which show that the impact of incorporating quality upgrading on the welfare
effects ofquotasdepends upon whether the initial data set for calibration is a trade-distorted
equilibrium or a free-trade equilibrium.
-
The first set of experiments in Table 2 begins from a trade-distorted equilibrium, with
the counterfactual in both cases (with and without quality variation) being a move to free
trade. Observations for each of two benchmark equilibria data sets are reported in value
terms in the upper panels (A. I and B. I), along with quantity observations. From the free-
trade counterfactual equilibria, the effects of removing quota restrictions can be seen in either
case (A.2 and 8.2). With or without quality variation, the North benefits both from the
domestic consumption gains from eliminating the quota and the saving on transfer of quota
rents, while the South loses because of the loss of the rent transfers. In equilibrium, the
domestic pricesofhigh and low quality goods are the same across the two countries.
In using the model with quality variation, the world welfare gain calculated as the
sum of Hicksian equivalent variations across the two countries is 3.51. In contrast, in the
case without quality variation, the sum of compensating variations is 2.89. Thus1 using a
trade-distorted equilibrium as the base case, the counterfactual equilibrium generated from a
model without quality variation yields a smaller welfare gain from the elimination of theTABLE 2
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quota trade restriction, demonstrating the negative specification bias that we outline above.
This result is not only truefor the arithmetic (global) sum of the Hicksian equivalent
variations, but aJso for the separate Hicksian equivalent variations calculated for the North
and the South.
Table3reports results for counterfactual equilibrium calculations executed in reverse
fashion; moving instead from a free-trade base case to a trade-distorted equilibrium.Inthis
case, the first benchmark equilibrium data set (A. 1.) is the samei as the counterfactual free
trade equilibrium data set (A.2.) reported in Table 2. This generates identical model
parameters to the earlier case through calibration. The counterfactual is the introduction of a
quota which leads to the same quota premia value as in the base case (data set (A.1)) in
Table 2. The s&ond equilibrium data set (BA.) reported in Table 3 is generated by
aggregating across the quality variations in Table 2. Results are again generated as welfare
comparisons across equilibria and across models, but unlike in Table 2, the welfare loss from
introducing the trade restriction is higher in the no-quality variation model than in the with-
quality variation model. Results in Table 3 thus show that introducing quality upgrading into
model-based analyses reduces the cost of restrictions (as per received wisdom), since Mther
substitution out of the restricting effects of the quota is possible, while results in Table 2
suggest the opposite.
The difference relative to Table 2 is that in Table 3 the quota premium values differ
across the two couriterfactuai equilibria produced by aggregated and disaggregated models
because calibration is no longer taking place to a given base-case quota premium value, but
instead to a free-trade equilibria in which the quota premium value is zero.17
Results in Table 2 also shed light on the results we mention above as to the effects of
quality upgrading on the relative price of higher and lower quality goods. They show how
these results can be reversed under a formulation which captures global price effectsfrom
supply side changes in exporting countries. Table 2(A) has been constructed in such a way
that the exporting country produces a higher proportion of high quality goods for export
relative to domestic consumption than is true of low-quality goods.' Incorporating this
feature, we obtain the result that, in a move from a bather-ridden equilibrium to free trade,
the proportional increase in the price of high-quality goods exceeds the proportional increase
in the price of low-quality goods.
Thiscanbe seen in Table 2 (Panel A), where the world price (as reflected in the
price received by the exporting country) for high-quality goods increases from 2 to 2.09, a
proportional increase of 1.045; whereas the proportional increase in the low-quality good is
only 1.03. As noted above, this is opposite to the earlier Falvey result for thesmall open
economy case because this analysis captures production and hence supply side effects in the
two countries and, in this case, these are strong enough to reverse the result. We also note
above that for developing countries, production of high-quality product, especially for export,
is commonly undertaken, and so this may be a more typical case than that considered in the
literature. Also in such cases it is clearly misleading to treat large importing countries as
price-takers.
6We note in passing that the quality upgrading welfare results stressed earlier are not
dependent on this feature of the example; while it has been incorporated so as to yield these
pricing results, we have also performed experiments yielding similar welfare results to those
above, but without the different relative price effects from conventional analysis by removing
this feature.18
5. SUMMARYANT)CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses numerical simulation methods to show how the reference point chosen
(free trade or a trade-distorted equilibrium)is criticalwhen evaluating the specification biases
that may be involved when analyzing the effects of trade restrictions (such as quotas) which
do not discriminate on the basis of quality. Specifically, and in contrast to conventional
wisdom, we show that whether or not explicitly including quality upgrading increases or
reduces the welfare costs of such trade restrictions is ambiguous as to sign, even in the
competitive case. Conventional wisdom is based on the intuition that incorporating added
substitution margins (quality variation) will reduce the cost of the restriction. This takes free
trade as the reference point. We argue that if the reference point is instead a trade-distorted
equilibrium, adding substitution possibilities raises rather than lowers the costs of such
restrictions, as increasingly severe distortions must be implied to generate the same reference
point equilibrium data. We also indicate that this is the intuition suggested by related
empirical work in public finance on the cost of distortions, which typically begins from
observed (or with tax) equilibria.
We finally note that effects on production as well as consumption in exporting
countries can also reverse the traditional pricing result that quality upgrading tends to iowa
the relative price of high to low-quality goods. Extensions of our analysis to more complex
cases involving multiple countries and qualities are possible. We have not undertaken them
since our intent is to make our main methodological point, rather than undertake more
realistic and elaborate calculations which are inevitably lesstransparent.19
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